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Summary 
This thesis looks into the changing role of the media in China since the initiation of 
economic reforms in 1978. The media setting has become increasingly complex since due 
to changes in ownership-structure, the emergence of advertising, and increasing private 
and foreign investment in the sector. The media situation in China is difficult to categorize, 
as neither western theories based on liberal thought, nor communist theories, are seen fit 
for the current socio-political and economic situation in China. China is special, with 
policies based on a communist political system, but with an economy moulded by capitalist 
ideas and age old Confucian precepts. On the one hand, the media has to abide by its 
traditional obligations to the Chinese Communist Party and the Government. On the other 
hand, it responds to the needs of an increasingly capitalist market. Finally, the media is 
also defined by its relationship with the general public. However, since the Chinese system 
is historically unique, there is as yet no consensus as to what the media‟s role should be.  
 
This thesis focuses on the current outlook of the Chinese media. The analysis rests 
primarily on empirical data from two major events that invoked massive media coverage – 
the Shanghai 2010 World Expo and the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize – and 
interviews/conversations with Chinese media professionals. The investigation reveals that 
there is no sense of separation between the media and the Chinese Government in the 
Chinese mindset. It becomes apparent that when it comes to „positive reporting‟ or 
„positive news‟, the media serves its purpose impartially of informing the public, the 
government and the market. However, in the case of politically sensitive information the 
public is excluded. According to the empirical data presented in this thesis it is fair to state 
that most Chinese are satisfied with the existing system, including the media. Behind this 
impression it is also clear that there is considerable diversity in terms of how different 
socio-economic groups relate to the media. The Chinese Government is bound to become 
more adaptable, but only to the extent where they still control and own the majority of 
Chinese media. The media in China today plays several roles; while they carry out the 
Party‟s policies, report world news and entertain, at the same time they try to serve as 
checks for the Government, and a few are trying to set the agenda for future reforms and 
changes in Chinese society. The media is likely to continue to change and challenge the 
status quo, and with the internet the Government will continue to be challenged by the 
public for information. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The motivation for this study developed from my academic background in journalism and 
East Asian studies, as well as my four years in China, both studying and working in the 
media field.  I wished to combine the theoretical aspects with the practical experience I 
have gained working and living in China - into my master thesis. The media‟s role in 
China is an intriguing matter to investigate and I will explore the media‟s changing 
relations to the Party / Government, the market based business and the general public.  
 
As China is playing an increasingly important role in the world, both economically and 
politically, it is also seen as important to understand various aspects of Chinese society, 
media being an important one of them. Due to China‟s way of governance, with one-party-
rule and the media largely owned by the Government, it can be argued that the role of the 
media differs significantly from what is seen as the role of the media in the West
1
, where 
the media is often portrayed as a watch dog over the Government and dominant groups in 
society. The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the media‟s role in today‟s Chinese 
society. On one hand, there are media‟s traditional obligations to the China Communist 
Party and the Government, on the other, media‟s responses to the needs of an increasingly 
capitalist market, and, finally, there is media‟s relation to the general public. 
 
1.1. Theme  
In the West, in most instances, journalists are considered to be efficient investigators, 
pushing back screens, peering behind facades and generally being a moral barometer for 
government and society. In China, most journalists are seen as a part of the Government 
apparatus. However, it must be noted that most journalists, whether in China, Norway or 
the United States for that matter, are often a part of a propaganda apparatus without even 
realizing it. Orwell (1946) writes: “to be corrupted by totalitarianism, one does not have to 
live in a totalitarian country”2. Orwell describes how censorship is present in all societies 
regardless of political nature. In what he refers to as free societies censorship is still 
present, but not as evident as in totalitarian societies. Herman and Chomsky (1988) argue 
that most journalists are part of a propaganda system, a system of gate-keeping information 
                                                 
1
 The United States, Europe, Australia and Canada  
2
 Orwell, G., 1946 (Online edition) 
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controlled by the government and the large media organizations. They claim that the news 
that is being reported to the public has been selected through a superfilter controlled by the 
agenda setters: the government and powerful organizations in the society.
3
 Therefore one 
can argue that Edmund Burke‟s concept of the press as a “fourth estate”4, the press acting 
as a watch dog, is not functioning as it should.
5
 This will be further explained in the theory 
part of this thesis.  
 
Considering these conflicting views, a question can then be raised of whether or not there 
is such a thing as objective reporting. One theory states that objective reporting indicates 
decision-making, thus already forcing the journalists to make a choice as to the readers‟ 
interest and knowledge. Ideally, journalists should provide representative coverage to all 
the public, and choose the correct time to report facts, present an interpretation or opinion.
6
 
But who actually sets the news agenda in today‟s society? Is it the public, the journalists, 
the editors, the advertisers, the owners of the media organizations, the politicians in power 
or the dominant and leading business organizations and industries? In China, the media 
setting has become increasingly complex in the last decades due to changes in ownership- 
structure, the emergence of advertising and the rise in private and foreign investment. 
However, the question of whether the news reported by the Chinese media still comes from 
central knowledge dictated by the state‟s political and ideological structures in party-organ 
style remains. 
 
Furthermore one can ask whether the Chinese media tends to serve the state‟s need for 
political control rather than to serve the interests of the public; or to put the interest of 
advertisers and private and foreign investors above those of consumers and readers. The 
public can be divided into several interest groups in regards to the media, the government 
and the market. The question of who the media serves is not a predicament found only in 
China. One can use the recent Murdoch-affair as an example of dilemmas occurring in the 
West, where the English newspaper, News of the World had to close down after a phone 
hacking scandal.
7
 One can ask whether or not this ruthless style of reporting is a result of 
                                                 
3
 Herman, E., S. and Chomsky, N., 1988  
4
 The fourth power after executive, legislature and judiciary 
5
 www.cultsock.ndirect.co.uk/MUHome/cshtml/index.html 
6
 Hurst, J., 1991 
7
 http://articles.cnn.com/2011-07-10/world/uk.phonehacking_1_andy-coulson-news-international-ed-
miliband?_s=PM:WORLD 
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the increasingly competitive news market or if it responds to the public‟s demand for a 
certain type of news? The scandal not only led to the closing of the newspaper, but it also 
led to an ongoing investigation about the “ethics and standards of British journalists”.8 In 
China‟s case the question is whether there is a contradiction between the state‟s, the 
public‟s and the market‟s needs when it comes to the role of the media. This thesis intends 
to examine selected media theories and apply them to the Chinese media situation since 
1978, empirically illustrated by how two major events (the World Expo 2010 and the 2010 
Nobel Peace Prize) were covered in the media, and interviews with a sample of media 
professionals, reflecting their opinions on key media dimensions. 
 
1.2. Research questions  
Between 1949 and 1979, the media‟s role in the People‟s Republic of China (PRC) was 
basically to communicate the Party‟s policy to the people. Along with the economic and 
social changes that occurred in Chinese society since the late 1970s, the media‟s role has 
changed, not least because of its function in the emerging market economy. Therefore, the 
overall research question to be answered is:   
 
How has the Chinese media changed since 1978? 
 
In order to answer this question, the following sub-questions will be addressed:  
 
1) How have the media‟s relations to the Government/the CCP changed? 
2) How have the media‟s relations to the general public changed? 
3) How have the media‟s relations to the market changed along with the economic 
reforms since 1978?  
 
In the next section the procedure used for gathering the information required in order to 
answer these questions is briefly presented.  
 
                                                 
8
 http://articles.cnn.com/2011-07-10/world/uk.phonehacking_1_andy-coulson-news-international-ed-
miliband?_s=PM:WORLD  
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1.3. Methodology Approach 
In order to find relevant information and therefore be able to answer the research 
questions, this thesis intends to use multiple methods such as literature reviews, content 
analysis of mass media, interviews with a sample of media players, and an analysis of two  
major events that was covered in the Chinese media, The Shanghai World Expo 2010 and 
the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize. These two cases will be briefly examined in terms of how 
they have been handled in one national and one regional media. The two chosen media - 
Shanghai Daily
9
 and Xinhua News Agency
10
  - were selected based on their relevance and 
size, availability online and English language-reporting. The articles included in the 
analysis have been selected based on their political tone and relevance to the research 
questions.  
 
Information from interviews with key players in a number of Chinese media has been 
systematized in tables in accordance with four main topics of conversation; CCP influence 
on daily work; Instructions given by the Government; Punishments; and Thoughts on 
current media system. The answers are consciously written as quotes in order for the reader 
to get the precise tone of the interviewees‟ responses. Since the interviews are based on 
topics of conversation they do not follow a specified interview guide. The media 
professionals are selected because they represent a wide range of Chinese media, thus 
reflecting today‟s media landscape in China: Shanghai Daily, Xinhua News Agency, China 
                                                 
9
 Established in 1999, English-language newspaper in Shanghai and the Yangtze River Delta region. 
Business-focused, but also reports on social, cultural and diplomatic developments in Shanghai, China and 
world news. Circulation 85000 + 
10
 Founded in 1931, has more than 100 bureaus worldwide that has the dual role of both collecting 
information on world affairs and offer information about China. Xinhua reports directly to the Communist 
Party of China's Publicity and Public Information Departments. In 1997 Xinhuanet was launched, and today 
provides news in six languages, reaching around 200 countries, and according to their net page has around 80 
million page views per day. 
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Central Television
11
, Shanghai Media Group
12
, 21
st
 China Business Herald
13
, China 
Daily
14
, QQ / Tencent
15
 and Phoenix Television
16
. 
 
With this as a backdrop an assumption was made prior to further investigating the topic.  
1.4. Assumptions  
When examining the abovementioned literature and empirical data, this thesis will argue 
that in order to understand the role of the Chinese media in the current society, one has to 
have some knowledge of the traditional role of the media in China and of the socio-
political changes that have taken place over the last 30 years. It is also important to bear in 
mind that the concept of media is a construction of the West. This is particularly obvious in 
international media studies of China, where Western theories are frequently used as a 
backdrop for studying the post-reform Chinese media sphere. Similarly, the former Soviet 
Union is commonly used as a backdrop for media studies in communist countries. In both 
cases certain difficulties emerge when directly applying international theories to China. For 
instance, these theories do not acknowledge the differences between the former Soviet 
Union and the PRC, ignoring the unique situation experienced by China and the media 
after 1949. Tension between the Chinese mindset, fundamental conflicts between systems 
of ideas, such as Confucianism and western thoughts and philosophy, play an important 
role when trying to understand Chinese media.  
 
When examining the journalistic discourses and media theories through the examples of 
the World Expo 2010 and the 2010 Nobel Prize, this thesis assumes that the function of the 
                                                 
11
 The state television broadcaster in mainland China and is one of the most important news broadcast 
companies in China. CCTV has a network of 19 channels broadcasting, is accessible to approximately one 
billion viewers. This station is one of the official outlets of the Chinese government, and reports directly to 
high-level officials in the Propaganda Department of the Communist Party of China. 
12
 A multimedia television and radio broadcasting, news and Internet company. SMG was formed in 2001 
after a merger between the People‟s Radio Station of Shanghai, East Radio Shanghai, Shanghai Television 
Station and Oriental Television Station. 
13
 The main product of 21st Century News Group which is China‟s leading financial media group. It is a 
Chinese language international daily newspaper with headquarter in Guangzhou with branches in the major 
Chinese cities. Circulation 762,000 + 
14
 Established in 1981, first national English newspaper in China. Circulation 300.000 +. Have an open goal 
to act as a mouth piece for the Party, reflects the CCP‟s foreign policy. 
15
 Founded in 1998 and is China's largest and most used Internet service portal, provides news as well as 
entertainment. In 2010 there were 636 million active QQ users. 
16
 A Hong Kong-based Mandarin Chinese television broadcaster. Good relations with the PRC government, 
but non-government related. Available in mainland China to all and is sometimes given freedom to broadcast 
information not covered by the government media. 
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media in China is quite different from the purpose of media in the West. From a strict 
western point of view it may look like the media in China is in some ways misleading the 
public by just presenting what is wanted by the Government. However, it is important to 
bear in mind that the media sphere in China today is, like the PRC itself, relatively young 
compared to western nations‟ media and institutions. It is likely that changes will continue 
to occur in the media along with other national policy modifications and changes. In 
particular it is assumed that the increasingly powerful market economy will have a marked 
influence on the media, and, may affect relations between both media and Government, 
and between media and the general public. 
  
1.5. Structure of the thesis 
The second chapter of the study will introduce the theoretical framework and media 
theories. These theories were selected due to their relevance for the research topic, and 
their importance in the field of journalism. The theories presented will provide the context 
for discussing the media‟s role in China since 1978. In the third chapter the Chinese media 
is placed in a historical context, with emphasis on the post-1978 media setting. In order to 
get a more representative impression of the media today, two media cases have been 
selected for examination and analysis, and they are presented in Chapter 4 alongside the 
interviews. In Chapter 5 the findings and analysis of the empirical data will be compared 
with the assumptions. The sixth and final chapter provides the concluding remarks.   
 
1.6. Delimitation and limitations  
The focus of the examination is the media situation in mainland China, not including Hong 
Kong, Taiwan and Macao. Despite delimiting this study to mainland China it is, however, 
interesting to look at an alternative case which by comparison can help contextualize the 
analysis. Therefore this study briefly presents the media situation in South Korea where 
there are and have been similarities in the media‟s role in the two countries. The deliberate 
delimitation in the scope of the analysis is due to the relevance for this study on the 
media‟s role in relation to the CCP, the general public and the market. A limitation may be 
that the research is based mainly on literature in English, and due to this there might be 
literature that has not been available for examination, such as relevant articles in Chinese 
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and Russian. It is also acknowledged that the outcome of the interview data could have 
been dissimilar if the interview objects had been different.  
 
In the next chapter, the thesis will present the theoretical framework, taking a step back 
from China and giving an overview of international, western theories of media. Such an 
overview is necessary in order to highlight the specific viewpoint many western critiques 
apply when doing their analysis of Chinese media. This section will also look at thoughts 
on the media‟s role from a Leninist, Marxist and Maoist view, and later try to see how 
these have been applied to Chinese society after 1978. 
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2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
This chapter will present selected media theories, which are relevant to the purpose of this 
study and are particularly significant for the field. These theories are seen as applicable to 
the focus of the thesis on the Chinese media sector and its role in the Chinese society. It is 
important to set a solid background for analyzing the role of the media by presenting both 
western theories and theories on media in Communist countries. The different approaches 
will illustrate how the media‟s role differs in relation to the government, the market and the 
public in different settings. One can claim that the modern, western notion of a free press 
that emerged in the 19
th
 century was a result of continuous social processes, starting in the 
17
th
 century.
17
 Many western theories hold the viewpoint that a liberal democratic society 
is the optimal democracy, and that a free press is a natural part of such societies. The 
media and the role of journalists are generally contextualized in a western setting, and thus 
such theories have limited applicability in China.  
 
2.1. Western theories on the role of media  
The role of the media has been discussed from various points of view, from those that 
claim the media should impartially enlighten the public to those that believe that most 
media is a part of government‟s propaganda apparatus, or conversely that the media should 
question the intentions of government‟s and large organizations.  
 
Lippman‟s theory, stated in his book Public Opinion (1922), calls for the need of 
journalists as the truth-seeking elite. The media should, through their knowledge, enlighten 
the public and thus actively shape public opinion. He writes that the common people 
cannot themselves analyze news they do not have background information on, they are not 
able to see what is in their interest or not. Lippman claims that in most cases people are 
incapable of getting the facts right themselves, due to the complexity of the world.
18
 He 
writes:  
“For the real environment is altogether too big, too complex, and too fleeting for direct 
acquaintance. We are not equipped to deal with so much subtlety, so much variety, so many 
permutations and combinations. And although we have to act in that environment, we have to 
reconstruct it on a simpler model before we can manage with it.” 19  
                                                 
17 
http://journalismethics.info/media_law/history_of_free_press.htm
 
18 
Lippman, W., 1922 
19
 Ibid., p: 19  
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Therefore we need experts to guide the public, to discern the correct facts and situations. 
However this is not just the media‟s role. The media itself needs to be informed by experts 
working for various organizations, companies and the government. If not, the media is 
given way too much freedom in forming the public opinion.
20
 Lippman‟s theory remains 
significant in studies of the role of the media, and in China‟s context one can see signs that 
the Chinese Government has appointed themselves as the experts. If this is the case, the 
Chinese Government controls the news reported to the public. This kind of situation is in 
direct opposition to the other end of the spectrum of media theories. For instance, Dewey 
(1927) insists that the public should decide what news is important for them, and the 
journalists should then pick up on that, and report that news.
21
 This is similar to modern 
news-reporting values, stating that the role of the media is to bridge „insiders‟ and 
„outsiders‟. Journalists should ideally be honest people, in possession of knowledge 
beyond that of the general public, obtained objectively through interviews and sources. 
This knowledge should then be reported to the public as objectively as possible. There are 
four fundamental principles in journalism: honesty, fairness, independence and respect.
22
 
Ideal journalism should combine descriptive accounts and analysis. Media professionalism 
can be defined as a commitment to claims of objectivity, balance and ideological 
neutrality.
23
 Regardless of the code of ethics for journalists, there are those that claim that 
journalists can never be fully objective.
24
 That the journalist‟s objectivity gets affected by 
the audience, their interests and who the readers are.  
 
Obviously journalists are not the only agenda setters, some even claim they are misled into 
believing they are, but are in fact playing by someone else‟s rules; the government and the 
owners. Herman and Chomsky (1988) argue that the media is part of a propaganda system, 
saying that the mass media guides the general public with the correct “values, beliefs, and 
codes behavior”25 set by the government and the large media organizations, that will help 
integrate the public “into the institutional structures of the larger society.”26 The 
propaganda model, the authors claim, exists all over the world, though more easily 
                                                 
20
 Lippman W., 1922  
21
 Lecture: On Dewey and journalism, University of Technology Sydney used by Professor Penny 
O‟Donnell, 27 August 2003  
22
 http://www.australian-news.com.au/codethics.htm 
23
 Lee, C., C., 1994, 
24
 Hurst, J., 1991  
25
 Herman, E., S. and Chomsky, N., 1988, p: 1   
26
 Ibid., p: 1 
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recognized in countries and societies where there is a state monopoly of the media. But it is 
also noticeable in countries where the media is private and seemingly independent (this is 
similar to what Orwell wrote in 1946). In the former, formal censorship is openly 
acknowledged, while in the latter censorship is seemingly absent.
27
 The propaganda model 
is a means of disguising and maintaining the inequality of wealth and power in a society, it 
allows government and large private interests to decide what messages/news should be 
reported to the public. Five news filters are identified, basically sorting out which news to 
be presented to the audience. They are: Size, ownership, and profit orientation of the mass 
media; The advertising license to do business; Sourcing Mass-Media News; Flak and the 
Enforces; and Anticommunism as a control mechanism.
28
 The news which ends up being 
reported has passed through this superfilter, not controlled by the media, but by the 
government and other powerful organizations and groups in society. The five filters slim 
the information that passes through the gates, and construct limitations as to what becomes 
news. Thus, what becomes news is already filtered before reaching the media, and in a way 
the mass media do not themselves decide on the content they pass on to the public. Events, 
news, happenings (negative and positive), news about people, and groups that are seen as 
less important by the ruling government and their ideology are often filtered out and never 
reported.
29
 If this is the case, the propaganda model not only filters out potential important 
news, but the grounds for interpretation and objective reporting is already decided upon by 
the dominating elite. Herman and Chomsky (1988) write that many journalists believe that 
they are objectively reporting on news and are working within the rules of professional 
news values and reporting (as mentioned earlier: honesty, fairness, independence and 
respect).
30
 In China, due to the one-party-rule, as opposed to western democratic countries, 
the Party has a stronger role in defining the news. This point will be further elaborated on 
in Chapter 5.  
 
The concept of a “fourth estate”, first used in the discussion on the role of the media by 
Edmund Burke
31
 in 1787 in Britain, is important in the discussion of media theories. 
Behind the concept of the media as a fourth estate is the notion that the media represents 
                                                 
27
 Herman, E., S. and Chomsky, N., 1988   
28
 Ibid. 
29
 Ibid. 
30
 Ibid. 
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wardens of democracy, its main role being to look after the public‟s interest. The concept 
of the media as a fourth estate can only be imagined in liberal democratic countries, and is 
in most cases not applicable in the Chinese media setting.
32
 This concept represents an 
ideal form of journalism which is not applicable to all modern societies, neither in the West 
nor in China. It is also important to note that media in the West is not always operating in 
the public‟s interest, but is also bound by regulatory frames and various interests of 
owners/advertisers/investors.  
 
The next section will examine media from a communist perspective.  
 
2.2. Media from a Communist perspective    
The media theories described in 2.1. are in most cases based on western ideas, whereas in 
this section, the thesis will look at media from different perspectives – Marxist, 
Communist, Leninist and Maoist. The classic communist ideology states that, in a 
communist society the individual‟s interest is basically the same as society's interest.  So in 
a sense the need for individual freedom ceases. However, Marx actually defends the right 
to freedom of the press, writing that censorship was an instrument created by the bourgeois 
elite as a tool to dominate the weak.
33
 This will be elaborated on in section 3.4. - Media‟s 
role after a successful revolution. 
  
In Lenin‟s collected works one can find some interesting views on the media‟s role during 
a revolution or in a communist society. He writes in Terms of Admission into Communist 
International (published in 1921 in The Second Congress of the Communist International, 
Verbatum Report) that the daily media and propaganda should all be “genuinely communist 
in character”34. All the press organs that belong to the Party “must be edited by reliable 
Communists who have given proof of their devotion to the cause of the proletarian 
revolution”. The communist thought “should be popularised in such a way that the 
practical facts systematically dealt with in our press day by day will drive home to every 
                                                                                                                                                    
31 Edmund Burke (1729 – 1797) born in Dublin. He was a politician and political thinker of 18th century in 
Britain. He is seen as the father of modern conservatism, and representative of classical liberalism. 
(http://www.historyguide.org/intellect/burke.html / http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/burke/)   
32
 www.cultsock.org/index.php?page=media/4estate.html 
33
 http://www-cs-faculty.stanford.edu/~eroberts/cs201/projects/communism-computing-
china/censorship.html 
34
 www.marx.org: Terms of Admission into Communist International (1920), Lenin‟s Collected Works 
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rank-and-file working man and working woman, every soldier and peasant, that it is 
indispensable to them.”35 The media in his view seems to be a propaganda apparatus 
serving the Party, enlightening and informing the public on the status quo and the Party‟s 
plans, visions and ideology. However, it seems fair to wonder if Lenin‟s view on the media 
changed along with his historically changing roles, from, first, a radical political dissident 
to, later, a state leader.  
 
Mao‟s opinions of the media are not too far from Lenin‟s. In 1948, Chairman Mao Zedong 
stated in a speech: “The role and power of the newspapers consist in their ability to bring 
the Party program, the Party line, the Party‟s general and specific policies, its tasks and 
methods of work before the masses in the quickest and most extensive way”.36 In an 
interview with an American journalist in 1944, Mao claimed the Party also used the media 
to reveal the opinions of the people: 
“We listen to the people. Through the media of popular meetings in villages, towns, districts, 
regions, and everywhere in our territories; through individual conversations between party 
members and men and women of all strata of the population; through special conferences, 
newspapers, and the telegrams and letters we receive from the people - through all this we 
can, and do, always find out the real, undisguised opinion of the masses.”37  
The media was to spread positive news and encourage the masses. But only a few years 
after the revolution, Mao claimed the press had been wrongly used in China during the 
1950s.
38
 
“Since the beginning of this year (1956) there has been one-sided and unrealistic propaganda 
in the press for improving the people's livelihood, but very little publicity has been given to 
building the country through diligence and thrift, combating extravagance and waste and 
encouraging hard work, plain living and sharing weal and woe with the masses, which should 
from now on be the focus of our propaganda in the press.”39  
He called for the necessity to meet with the press, and as he puts it, “to exchange views 
with them and inform them of the guiding principles in our propaganda.”40 For Mao, it 
seems as if the media was a direct tool for the Party to communicate their policies and 
ideology to the masses.  
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There has been a number of theories on the media‟s role in Communist countries, and one 
of the most significant is the “Soviet Communist Theory of the press” formulated by 
Schramm in 1964.
41
 The theory was unchallenged for decades and used as the theoretical 
framework for the press system in China, the Soviet Union and other self-claimed 
Communist and Marxist nations. The theory takes the press in former Soviet as its main 
focus of examination and the basic conclusion is that the Soviet communist media was 
“anti-professional and anti-commercial as they were used instrumentally by the communist 
party state for various political purposes, particularly as propaganda tools.”42 It claims 
that the media had a single purpose: to serve the party.
43
 This theory has also been 
accepted by the Chinese journalism community, and Schramm has been described as the 
“father of communication study”.44 Schramm died in 1987, giving him no opportunity to 
modify his theories according to the modernization and development in China.  
 
However in 1984, in the “Marxist approach”, Altschull criticized the “Soviet Communist 
Theory” by calling it ideologically biased.45 46 He identified three categories in which the 
media could be placed: media promoting the market, communitarian media, and media for 
advancing public opinion. He argued that media was trying to serve the public. Altschull 
claimed that the media focused on neutrality, but was actually promoting and supporting 
capitalism.
47
 The two media theories on Communist and Marxist models both use former 
Soviet as case studies, and are considered outdated in relation to today‟s China. 
2.3. Summing up the literature review  
A variety of media theories has been described above in order to be able to more clearly 
understand the suggested, interpreted and changing role of the media, both in Western and 
Communist societies. During the 1980s and early 1990s, literature from Chinese 
universities suggested that China had moved from communism into “postcommunist 
neoauthoritarian”48 under the market economy with Chinese characteristics. The Chinese 
news media no longer had the single purpose of communication, as it went beyond 
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propaganda to provide news, general information and entertainment.
49
 The theories 
presented about the media‟s role range from considering the media as a part of government 
apparatus, to those that see it as a free actor in society, a voice for the masses, and to 
promoting market forces. Whatever role the media has, it is valid to state that in most 
countries the media is in one way or the other incorporated in the agendas of decision-
makers.   
 
2.4. Relating theory review to the research questions  
None of the theories above are seen as totally applicable to the Chinese media setting 
today. The western theories are in most cases based on societies that have developed based 
on liberal democratic thought, and the media is perceived, most of the time, to be working 
outside the borders of government control. The “Soviet Communist Theory” which has 
been used to understand media in Marxist or Communist societies
50
, is not applicable in 
current Chinese society due to the coexistence of a capitalist market system and a 
communist political system. The theories proposed by Lippman (1922), Altschull (1984), 
and Herman and Chomsky (1988) support the idea of media in the service of the 
government, but also leave room for it to cater to the market. Both in Lippmann and 
Herman and Chomsky, the market, in terms of advertisers and owners, are given decision-
making power on the news agenda. Serving solely the public is seen as a utopian illusion, 
but Dewey, Burke and Hurst put forward solid theories as to how it can be achieved, or at 
least head in that direction. This will be further discussed in Chapter 4. In the next chapter 
this essay will account for the history of the Chinese media. 
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3: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE CHINESE MEDIA  
To understand the various roles the media has played in China since the abolishment of the 
imperial dynasty, it is important to summarize the history of the media in China. The thesis 
will focus on the Chinese media after the reforms starting in 1978, when the Chinese media 
system changed as a direct consequence of the economic reforms. However, it is important 
to include events prior to 1978 to get a broader understanding of the Chinese society and 
media development. The media in China has been influenced by history and the socio-
economic development, American and western doctrines, Confucianism, as well as 
Marxism, Leninism, Maoism and Dengism
51
.  
 
3.1. Brief introduction to the Chinese media before 1978  
The media in the modern western sense did not exist in China before the end of the 1800s. 
It was built up during the modernization process, influenced by the contact with the 
European powers at the end of the 19
th
 century, and the main objective for the press was to 
promote enlightenment, reform and national independence.
52
 However, it is claimed that 
the oldest newspaper in the world is Chinese, the Peking Gazette (from year 581)
53
. It was 
a tool for the Chinese Emperor to communicate instructions to the public.
54
 However, the 
first journalism school in China was only established in 1918 at the Peking University, 
where American journalism had a great influence during the formative stage of Chinese 
journalism education. The link with the United States was maintained until the CCP took 
over the mainland in 1949.
55
 Xu, Chu and Guo (2002) argue that before the takeover by the 
Communist Party in 1949 the media tried to follow western style journalism, but from 
1949 they changed to the Soviet model
56
, both described in Chapter 2.  
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However, before the CCP took power in China they had already founded a newspaper 
(Xiangdao which translates to Guide) in 1921, the same year as the founding of the Party. 
Before 1949 the Party published several newspapers and magazines to generate support for 
its revolutionary objectives.
57
 Looking back at history, this was more or less the media‟s 
role in China until the reform period in the 1970s. It is important to bear in mind that there 
were several factions within the CCP, with each of them supporting different views, and 
accordingly, trying to influence the media to gain popular support.  
 
3.2. Chinese media development since 1978 
In 1978 Deng Xiaoping initiated the Chinese economic reform program, thus also bringing 
major changes to China‟s media system. Along with the launching of the economic 
reforms, came the call for development and reforms in society and in the political 
discourse. Before 1978 all media in China was financed and run by the Party/State. Two 
types of papers existed: the party organs whose sole purpose was to act as a mouthpiece for 
the Party and under supervision of the Party‟s propaganda department; and the second was 
a mixture of non-party publications operating under government entities and social and 
scientific associations that had licenses to publish their own papers within their field.
58
 
This was basically the Soviet system with some minor variations.  
 
As a result of the economic reforms, the press was gradually pushed into managing and 
operating on a financially self-sufficient basis. Despite this, during the 1980s and 1990s, as 
a result of the new situation in China and the Dengist approach to Communism, the 
Chinese media continued to flourish and expand, both in numbers and function. One 
witnessed a development of the so-called evening papers, an expansion of pages in already 
existing newspapers, additional weekend editions, joint-venture press, and the emergence 
of city newspapers.
59
 Though the media was still considered a tool for the Party‟s ideology, 
the new economic and cultural roles it played - became more important. A different role 
for the media emerged, not just to inform but also to entertain for the purpose of selling, 
and thus survive in the market. Between 1979 and 1989 advertisement grew.
60
 Winfield 
and Peng (2006) argue that “the previous totalitarian definition of the media as an 
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instrument of class struggle was officially dropped”.61 The final and official change came 
in 1992 at the CCP 14
th
 National Congress, where the central and local governments 
adopted a new financial policy regarding the media, which basically intended to reduce and 
finally end press subsidies.
62
 This became the true turning point for the Chinese media as it 
turned into a business industry and was now restructured to serve both the readers and the 
advertisers along with the CCP.
63
 In the last few decades the media‟s function has changed, 
from primarily serving the government to also serving the market. However, one could ask 
if it also really serves the general public? By the mid 1990s the media had financial 
independence from the Government, and were actually generating big revenues for the 
national economy. The advertisers provided the necessary conditions for economic 
support, and the media now began to emphasize business, mass appeal and lifestyle to 
attract readers.
64
 The Department of Propaganda and the Ministry of Education estimated 
in their first national conference on journalism in 1983 that more than 250.000 Chinese 
were working in communication activities and professions though very few of them had 
actually been educated in the field. With the rapid growth of the Chinese press as 
illustrated above, a demand for educated journalists emerged. The development of the 
media landscape, more competition amongst the various publications, and the emergence 
of more television channels along with the end of subsidies from the State, all facilitated in 
redefining the function of journalism in China.
65
  
 
Table 1 reproduced from Winfield and Peng (2006) illustrates how the media discourse has 
changed as a result of the media reforms, though one can put a question mark as to how 
these changes differ from theory to practice. There are still unclear lines and the 
Government still plays an important role in deciding what is reported to the public.
66
 
Perhaps the unclear lines are part of a well-planned strategy so that the Government can 
see what works, and how rules and regulations are met by the media, the West and the 
public, and then change them accordingly. 
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TABLE 1: Major Changes Brought on by Commercialization of the Media
67
 
 PAST NOW 
Ownership Directly state-owned, highly 
centralized for all information and 
distribution 
1. In theory and officially, still 
state-owned 
2. Indirect ownership by collective 
and private businesses  
Financial support Government-funded Chiefly advertising, circulation, 
financial investment 
Management and editorial 
personnel  
Government appointed 1. Government appoints key 
leading positions in major state 
and local government news media.  
2. Market hiring for professional 
management and editorial 
positions in non-key state media 
units 
Functions of the media  Single functions:  
Mouthpiece of the Party:  
Ideological indoctrination 
Multiple functions:  
1. Mouthpiece of the Party 
2. Source for advertising 
3. High circulation and audience 
Nature of media products Political and ideological 
propaganda 
Propaganda as well as market 
commodity 
Structure Party news organs; Highly 
centralized 
Multi-structure: 
1. Centralized state mainstream 
media, 
2. Outer circled quasi-government 
media, 
3. Fringe media 
Actors Party and government 
representatives  
Entrepreneurs, media 
professionals, entertainers, 
advertisers, semi-official interest 
groups 
Media content Official government news News, entertainment, advertising, 
foreign programs and 
independently produced programs   
 
The main conclusion one can draw from Table 1 is that the Government has ceased being 
the only decisive player in the Chinese media. As one can see in the right hand rows there 
has been a shift in the Government‟s role and the media appears to have more choices, 
both in terms of ownership and financial support.  Most media in China today is income-
driven, and the need for them to attract advertisers is another significant change. As 
mentioned earlier, there has been a transformation from simply being a government 
information channel to an entertainment source for the public. Another dilemma for the 
Chinese Government which has emerged following the media reforms is the increasing 
slackness of direct control. Prior to the reforms the Government had much more direct 
control, both politically and ideologically, through direct censorship. With more actors and 
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international influence in the media landscape, control is now more difficult for the 
Government to exercise. 
 
Following the changes in ownership, structure and personnel, as well as the transformation 
of the functions of the media, means of control over the media changed accordingly. In 
Table 2 there are examples of how the political and ideological control has changed, 
alongside economic, institutional, legal and administrative changes.  
 
TABLE 2, Government Controls: Old and New 
68
 
 PAST PRESENT 
Political and ideological control  Censorship, punishment, fines, 
imprisonment 
Government censorship, self-
censorship, access blocking 
Economic control Ownership, funding State monopoly, conglomeration  
Institutional control Party propaganda, department for 
overall control 
Bureaucratization of media 
regulation agencies. The State 
Council Information Office, The 
State Press and Publication 
Administration  
Legal control  Constitution, state laws Constitution, state laws, civil 
laws, liberal and privacy 
Administrative control Personnel appointment Personnel appointment, certificate 
for journalists, guidelines for yes 
and no 
 
Prior to the reforms the Party had a more direct form of control over the media, naturally 
because they were its sole benefactor. After the changes illustrated in Table 1, the control 
of the media was adjusted to meet the new media setting characterized by different 
ownership structures and the emerging role of the media as an entertainment channel. 
Government control mechanisms endure, but they seem to be more subtle than in the past. 
It is obvious that the Government has control over the media to some extent, especially 
through the legal overseeing of media institutions. All media businesses, including internet 
portals have to be approved by a government regulation agency. In the past the 
Government could appoint the editors-in-chief and the heads of media organizations, 
however now this is seldom exercised due to the changes in ownership structure.
69
 Another 
new factor is the responsibility placed on the individual media personnel. To a higher 
degree than before, those working in the media environment have to self-regulate/censor 
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their contributions. There are fines for overstepping the rules and regulations. This will be 
further looked upon in 4.2 – Interviews, and Chapter 5.   
 
A different issue that emerged in the context of the remaining state monopoly of the media 
was widespread corruption. An example is the mining accident in Shanxi province in 2002 
when journalists were paid not to report the accident, and not to reveal anything to the 
public via media channels. Asia Times writes about the event: “the issue of journalistic 
ethics is a chronic problem in China and the cover-up scandal that happened in Shanxi is 
just the tip of an ugly iceberg of corruption in Chinese journalism.”70 China Daily 
supported the severe accusation: “unprofessional journalists by no means exist in small 
numbers”.71 Huang (2007) claims that state monopoly, the lack of a watchdog mechanism 
and the absence of a media law are contributing to the corruption in the Chinese media.
72
 
Since 1949 and up to the 1980s the state was the sole owner and investor in the media 
industry, allowing no private or foreign ownership, or any investment from state owned 
enterprises (SOEs) unrelated to the media sector.
73
 Therefore, even though there had been 
market-oriented reforms in all other industries in China, up to the 1990s the media industry 
was still resolutely a state monopoly.  
 
Today China has more than 2000 newspapers, 200 TV channels, 9000 magazines and 450 
radio stations.
74
 They are categorized into three groups by Winfield and Peng (2006):  
 
1) Official mainstream media; state news organizations directly owned and operated by the 
government.   
2) The outer circle; trade papers and various regional media.  
3) Fringe media; new media organizations founded after 1978, financially and administratively 
independent from the Government. 
75
 
 
With this as a backdrop Peng and Winfield (2006) argue that the Chinese media plays a 
dual role: “Despite the fact that officially the media‟s role is still defined as the 
government‟s voice, the economic structure means they must accommodate the interests of 
their advertisers and their audiences.”76 After the market-oriented reforms the SOEs were 
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in direct competition with the new emerging private businesses. Huang (2007) writes: 
“There is no doubt that the market socialism model contributed greatly to the sector‟s 
transition from a traditional Communist propaganda-oriented model to an audience–
oriented model.”77 The ongoing commercialization of the media made it impossible for the 
Government not to adopt freer and more flexile media control.  
 
However, the increasing changes in Chinese society per se and the fact that most media 
organizations were losing money persuaded the Government to the search for new media 
reforms. “Beijing adopted a largely wait-and-see strategy or muddling-through policy, 
scrutinizing the possible impact of non-state investment in the government-monopolized 
media sector, on the one hand, and studying possible policy responses, on the other hand”, 
writes Huang (2007).
78
 Only a few weeks before China‟s accession to the WTO in 2001, 
the Hong Kong-based Phoenix Television (co-owned by Rupert Murdoch‟s Star Group and 
Chinese capital) was granted permission to directly broadcast non-news programs to cable 
television in Guangdong province. This marked the beginning of the relaxation towards 
foreign-owned media presence in China. In the next few weeks and months several similar 
permissions were granted to other outlets such as the China Entertainment Television 
(CETV), and an additional agreement was made between Murdoch‟s Star Group, CCTV 
and Guangdong Cable TV Network. Star Group was to provide Mandarin-language general 
entertainment channel to cable systems in Guangdong, and Murdoch‟s News Corp‟s Fox 
Cable Networks was to distribute CCTV 9 in the US.
79
  
 
An agreement for exchange of programs (to air shows that are produced outside China) 
was made between US CNBC Asia Pacific and the Shanghai Media Group in April 2001.
80
 
However, as Huang (2007) writes, it was not until a few years later, in 2004, that such 
arrangements became officially recognized by the Government in a document stating: 
“domestic private investor‟s right to invest in and partly own a media company, and 
indirectly recognize foreign investors‟ the same right”.81 There are several reasons the 
Government decided to finally open up the media industry, Huang (2007) writes: “The first 
consideration was to attract private and foreign investment to ease the media industry‟s 
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capital shortage.”82 In order to attract serious and stable investment, an official policy had 
to be documented. Pressure came both from the media industry as well as keen investors 
both from the mainland and abroad. The media industry was a potential gold mine, 
especially in terms of the consumer media market. “Second, Beijing‟s decision to partly 
open the media sector to foreign investors reflected its strategic consideration to establish 
its own national and global media networks by cooperating with, and learning from, 
leading global media corporations.” 83 This is made apparent by the agreements 
established before the official entering of WTO in 2001.  
 
However, today there are signs that Chinese media is facing a more conservative policy 
environment compared to just a few years ago, when liberal media policies were 
implemented prior to the Beijing Olympics. Premier Wen Jiabao commented to the British 
media during a trip to Europe in June 2011: “Tomorrow‟s China will be a democratic 
country…” However the same week the Danish newspaper Information printed information 
from Wikileaks documenting that the CCP by no means allows aggressive criticism 
towards the Party and the leaders, nor the promotion of other political systems and press 
freedom. In addition, the article claimed that the documents provided by Wikileaks state 
that “politically sensitive” information should be “blocked”, “destroyed” or “removed”. 
The documents, that Information claims is 100 percent genuine, were approved by the 
Central Committee, of which Premier Wen is a member.
84
 On the one hand, there are 
claims that China is encouraging a freer press, on the other, evidence to suggest the 
opposite. In 2010 Murdoch decided to disinvest from China, partly because of the 
restrictions on the media business that limited profit-making. News Corp tried to find ways 
to crack the Chinese market, but discovered there were too many restrictions on both 
foreign and local media companies, and therefore decided to invest in India.
85
 A Reuters-
article states that News Corp along with other media companies had high expectations 
when entering the Chinese market in the late 1990s and early 2000, but the authorities in 
China tightened their grip on the media in 2005.
86
 These signs indicate that the media in 
China may undergo changes towards a more strict and conservative policy. This will be 
further discussed in Chapter 5.   
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3.3. English-language media in China 
The first English language newspaper to appear in China was the translation of the Peking 
Gazette (see section 3.1) in the North China Herald in Shanghai during the 1800s and early 
1900s.
87
 Some claim that the English-language media has a special and more relaxed 
position in China‟s media system. With the opening-up policy implemented by Deng came 
the increase in number of print and broadcast media in English. Due to the language 
barrier, Guo and Huang (2002) claim that English media is more distanced from the power 
centre. However they do respect the regulations and are in compliance with the dominant 
mass ideology that all the media follow, so in a way they act as an English-language 
mouthpiece of the Party. Nevertheless the style of the journalism is more influenced by the 
western style of reporting due to the English language. Guo and Huang (2002) claim that 
the “journalists across different English news media are more inclined toward providing 
factual, balanced, and objective accounts of daily events than those in the Chinese-
language party press.”88 It could be claimed that the English-language press tries to a 
higher degree than the Chinese-language press to push the ideological limits.  
China Daily, the biggest English-language newspaper in China was launched on June 1st, 
1981. This was the country‟s only national English daily news paper until almost 20 years 
later, when Shanghai Daily began publishing. After this, more and more English-language 
magazines and newspapers have emerged all over China. There are only three national 
English news papers in China; China Daily, The Economic Observer and Global Times. 
Regionally, the most important are Shanghai Daily, Beijing Today and ShenZhen Daily.
89
 
With the increasing globalization and internationalization in China, the demand for English 
newspapers is likely to increase over the next few years.   
 
3.4. Media’s role after a successful revolution   
It is important to understand that the media‟s role in a classic Communist society is in 
theory different from that in most western countries. After a successful revolution, the 
media‟s role is, according to Marxist theory, to help the government. The media is not 
supposed to be critical of the government itself. According to classic Communism, as 
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expressed in the Communist Manifesto
90
 – after a revolution the society that emerges 
should be stripped of political and state organs:  
 
“When, in the course of development, class distinctions have disappeared, and all production 
has been concentrated in the hands of a vast association of the whole nation, the public power 
will lose it political character. Political power, properly so called, is merely the organised 
power of one class for oppressing another. If the proletariat during its contest with the 
bourgeoisie is compelled, by the force of circumstances, to organise itself as a class, if, by 
means of a revolution, it makes itself the ruling class, and, as such, sweeps away by force the 
old conditions of production, the it will, along with these conditions, have swept away the 
condition for the existence of class antagonisms and of abolished its own supremacy as a 
class.”91  
 
Free press and freedom of speech are seen as bourgeois freedoms.
92
 So when the 
communist revolution is successful, a media system as we know it in the West is not 
logical. The media, the party and the government become one. They are all there to serve 
the people. They all serve “in the interest of the immense majority”.93 The press should 
serve the people, not any particular group or power interests within society. Although 
when writing the Communist Manifesto, it was impossible for the authors to know how it 
would be used in the future.  
 
One can say that the Soviet Union is an example of how this ideology failed. But China 
differs from the Soviet Union, not least, due to Confucianism, which contributes to strong 
national identity, patriotism and pragmatism, illustrated in China‟s acceptance of the 
market economy‟s needs. The Chinese are more adaptable and willing to adjust their 
political path along with that of economic development. On those grounds one can wonder 
whether or not the outcome for China will differ from that of the Soviet Union‟s.   
3.5. Summing up historical background and Chinese media setting  
The Chinese media industry is defined by several factors: ownership structures, the 
media‟s role in society, its relation to the political context, government control and 
censorship, market liberalization and media commercialization.
94
 The information 
revolution with nearly instant spread of news thanks to satellite communications, the 
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internet, and the widespread use of mobile phones brought new challenges to the CCP‟s 
control over the media.  
 
In the former Soviet Union the abolishment of the Party‟s control over media in 1988-1989 
was one of the factors that led to the demise of the system, and it seems as if the CCP is 
afraid the same might happen in China. This outcome can be questioned, since there are 
many differences between the former Soviet Union in the late 1980s and China today. The 
Chinese Government has had to become more adaptable, but only to the extent where it 
still owns and controls the majority of Chinese media. In 2004 a new law stated that 
foreign and private media firms had to form joint ventures with Chinese state-owned media 
companies. In this venture the foreign or private part was only allowed to own 49 per cent 
of the business.
95
 Today the Chinese media plays several roles, from carrying out the 
Party‟s policies, to reporting on world news and entertaining the public. At the same time it 
tries to serve as checks for the Government, and a few are trying to set the agenda for 
future reforms and changes in the Chinese society.  
 
3.6. Research question revisited  
The media in China has gone through various changes following 1949 and 1978. From 
seemingly starting out as a means of communication for the Government, and supporting 
its every move, to a more lenient stance, where they try to question and enlighten the 
public within the boundaries of regulations set upon them. In the early 2000s it appeared 
that the Government was loosening its grip in order to attract capital, technology and 
know-how from international media organizations. These more relaxed policies seem to 
have led nowhere, since today one can witness stricter media policies than existed 10 years 
ago. Even though there are strong market forces behind the media, one can claim that more 
than ever the Chinese leaders have appointed themselves as information experts
96
. They do 
not allow the media to report in the public‟s interest, but mainly in the Government‟s. The 
media is a victim of a propaganda apparatus
97
, where the journalists cannot individually 
decide which news is important and which is not. Two recent events will now be analyzed 
to see if this assumption is valid.  
                                                 
95
 Huang, C., 2007 
96
 Lippman, W., 1922 
97
 Herman, S., E., and Chomsky, N., 1988 
 Page 26 
4. RESEARCH AND DATA COLLECTION   
To get a comprehensive look at how the media currently operates in China, both in relation 
to the Government‟s policies, the market and the public, two media events will be 
examined. Additionally, ten media professionals have been interviewed on their opinions 
on key media dimensions. The two events (the 2010 World Expo and the 2010 Nobel 
Peace Prize) will be analyzed first, followed by the empirical interview data. Both the 
cases and collected information will be used in Chapter 5, as part of the analysis and 
discussion.  
 
4.1. Cases 
The two events presented in this thesis have been chosen based on their international and 
national notoriety and because they portray opposing impressions of the Government - one 
positive (the 2010 World Expo) and one negative (2010 Nobel Peace Prize). The objective 
is to see how these two media events have or have not been used to portray the CCP 
policies. The two cases were treated quite differently by the media. The former being a 
prestige project for China, following the success with the Olympics in Beijing in 2008, the 
latter an event that questions China‟s political system.  The two cases will be examined 
through the coverage and tone of reporting in two selected Chinese media, one national 
(Xinhua) and one regional (Shanghai Daily).  
4.1.1. Case 1 – 2010 World Expo Shanghai China 
With 246 participating countries and international organizations, and more than 73 million 
visitors during the 184 day period, the Shanghai World Expo was the biggest World 
Exposition ever to be held. The Expo site covered 5.28 km2 in the centre of Shanghai, and 
the city‟s situation improved a lot in the run up to the event. The theme of the Expo “Better 
City, Better Life”, explored the relationship between the city and human life from three 
different perspectives: people, the city and the global environment.
98
 The event was 
important for the Government and China proved, yet again, to the rest of the world, what 
China is capable of (as did the 2008 Olympics). The event attracted almost all of the 
world‟s countries, large international companies and organizations and many of the most 
powerful leaders and business-people in the world. More than 22.900 events were held 
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during the six month period.
99
 This Government-run prestige project also made an impact 
on the media in China and how they reported the event. Below are a few news extracts, 
which constitute representative examples, drawn from an analysis of the Chinese media 
coverage of the 2010 World Expo.  
 
Shanghai Daily had an Expo supplement each day during the Expo period from May 1
st
 to 
October 31
st
 2010, and a web edition featuring several articles every day. Both covered all 
matters related to the event.
100
  
  
1) Wen Jiabao said the Expo 2010 Shanghai China had been a splendid event and added a 
glorious chapter to the Expo history. Calling the event "eye-opener" and "unforgettable", the 
Premier expressed heartfelt gratitude on behalf of the Chinese government and pay high 
tribute to all people who had participated in, supported and contributed to the first Expo held 
by a developing country. 
101
 
 
2) Some public facilities at the Expo site will be moved to other prominent places in Shanghai 
after the six-month event ends in October, including the drinking water fountains, mist 
sprayers and mobile toilets that have won praise from visitors, a senior Expo official said 
yesterday.
102
 
3) New energy has contributed about 50 percent of total energy combustion at the Expo since 
it opened on May 1, says Hong Hao, deputy secretary general of Shanghai municipal 
government and director general of the Bureau of Shanghai World Expo Coordination.
103
 
4) The patience of Chinese visitors has impressed me the most since the opening of Expo, as 
they have to wait for more than five hours for our pavilion, said Abdulrahman al-Shaikh, 
commissioner general of the Saudi Arabia Pavilion.
104
 
 
5) The World Expo boosted tourism in the city with more than 4.2 million tourists arriving in 
Shanghai over the May Day holiday period (April 30 to May 4), nearly 25 percent more than 
the same period last year, local tourism authorities said yesterday.
105
 
6) The World Expo is a grand event to showcase the best achievements of human civilization. 
It is also a great occasion for people from around the world to share joy and friendship, said 
the president (Hu Jintao). On this Expo, China will present to the world a country with 5,000-
year history, which is enjoying fast development and changes through reform and opening-up, 
he said.
106
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7) Closing ceremony: President Hu Jintao said he was confident the world would "witness a 
successful, splendid and unforgettable World Expo." "As the first registered World Expo 
hosted by a developing country, the Shanghai Expo will be an opportunity for China and also 
for the world," Hu said. "This show couldn't be done anywhere but in China," said David 
Atkins, the executive producer of the outdoor performance.
107
 
The Shanghai Daily Expo edition had the role of an information site/source before, during 
and after the Expo. The site had a multitude of reports for events of all kinds (political, 
cultural and business) that took place within the Expo site. Examining the selected extracts 
one can observe that: Example 1) stresses the success of China as the first developing 
country to hold an Expo and that China is adding splendor to the history of Expo. That 
today‟s China (read: led by the CCP) is able to pull off the world‟s biggest Expo ever. 
Examples 2) and 3) illustrate how the Expo was environmentally friendly by reusing 
several facilities form Expo after the six month event, and the fact that half the energy used 
is green energy. China is developing into an environmentally-friendly country. Examples 
1) and 4) give credit to the Chinese people: 1) how the Chinese people have contributed to 
the Expo and 4) how the Chinese people/visitors impress the foreign participants. Example 
5) very importantly stress the success Expo had for the city of Shanghai, in this case an 
increase in tourism. Example 6) gives credit to China, the Chinese political system and the 
successful development of the country. It also emphasizes China‟s long and grand history, 
and that China too has know-how to show the world. Example 7) confirms the success after 
the six months by President Hu Jintao.  
  
The extracts of examples of the political reporting of the event and the reports done by 
Shanghai Daily are clearly of a positive nature. The rhetoric used are exceedingly positive, 
using phrasing such as: “splendid event”; “glorious chapter to the Expo history”; 
“unforgettable”; “boosted tourism”; “won praise from visitors”; “patience of Chinese 
visitors”; “grand event”. In short one can say that the Expo was portrayed as an example of 
China‟s success and of its thriving development (attributed to the political system), success 
of the Chinese people and, envy from other countries. One can question if any of the 
articles are critical of China and Expo. They seem to be merely descriptions of what has 
happened, and read almost as an advertisement of China‟s (and Shanghai‟s) success.   
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Xinhua News Agency actively covered news from the Expo period, mostly related to 
official and political events.   
  
1)  Some 20 world leaders were present at the opening ceremony, including Chinese President 
Hu Jintao, French President Nicolas Sarkozy and South Korean President Lee Myung Bak. 
Addressing the ceremony, the International Exhibitions Bureau (BIE) President Jean-Pierre 
Lafon said "Better City, Better Life", the chosen theme of the exhibition, must drive people to 
improve the quality of life for the citizens of both developing and developed countries as the 
majority of the world's population now lives in cities.
108
  
2) Overseas Chinese hailed the opening ceremony of the 2010 Shanghai World Expo Friday, 
saying it was a "perfect example of integration of Chinese characteristics and world diversity." 
"As an overseas Chinese, I feel so proud to see such a great event being hosted by China, and I 
feel the same excitement as was in Beijing Olympic games," said He Xiaohui, a Chinese 
community leader in Washington. "The spectacular ceremony made me feel very proud to be a 
Chinese," he said.
109
 
 
3) The Paris-based Bureau International des Expositions (BIE) Thursday praised the organizers of the 
popular 2010 World Expo in Shanghai. BIE Secretary-General Vicente Loscertales also praised the 
organization of the Shanghai Expo, saying that everything was going smoothly and the number of 
visitors was very likely to meet set targets.
110
 
 
4) Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping urged Shanghai, China's economic and commercial hub, to push 
forward its reform and opening-up in an inspection tour to the metropolis. Reform and opening-up is 
the key to restructuring the nation's development pattern, Xi said. Xi also met with volunteers working 
at the Shanghai Expo venues during the tour. The Expo is a good chance for Shanghai to improve its 
management, Xi said, adding that the city should learn the good practices of other cities.
111  
 
Xinhua reported all official news, including reports on every meeting President Hu Jintao 
attended, as well as all political visitors. The political reports were all of a positive nature, 
and stated the success of the Expo. There were more reports in May than in the last few 
months of Expo. Xinhua‟s reports on political matters stressed China‟s role in the world, 
by highlighting such matters as the promotion of good relations with Taiwan and Japan, or 
the importance of the Chinese provinces and of minorities. Looking at the examples one 
can find: Example 1) leaves no question to China‟s global importance and its role (through 
the Expo) to develop the world into a better place, thus the theme: “Better City, Better 
Life”. Example 2) demonstrates the proud sensation of the overseas Chinese and how they 
are proud of being a part of China. This gives credit to boosting nationalism in China. 
Example 3) praised by foreign leaders. Shows that China and Shanghai are delivering 
world class events and they are exceeding expectations. Example 4) stresses the 
importance for continued growth and development of Shanghai into China‟s economic 
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hub, Expo representing a launching platform for that purpose. Xinhua‟s reporting describes 
the event in a positive manner. Some examples of phrases and wording that show the 
positive tone: “holds talk”; “stressing cooperation”; “advance ties”112; “hailed the opening 
ceremony”; “perfect example”; “praised the organizers”. In short, one can claim that 
Xinhua‟s reporting is stressing China as a major player on the global arena, capable of 
hosting the biggest and best Expo ever.  
 
4.1.1.1. Responding to research question and summing up 
From the chosen reports one can see that the Expo event was used as a positive media case, 
both to boost nationalism, but also to include the overseas Chinese in China‟s successful 
development. The positive reports stress the alleged success of the political system and of 
the current leadership, making the political nature and influence of CCP policies on 
reporting evident. In China the Expo was portrayed solely as a positive occasion, with the 
press using the Party line and focusing on the positive effects of the event. One can see 
articles about strengthening political ties, the development of new energy sources, 
cooperation between multinational companies among other success stories. It seems that 
when reporting on the Expo, the media was serving the Government, thus the style of 
reporting could be said to fit the “Soviet Communist Theory”113. Since the media was 
already given instructions on what they should report they were refused the responsibility 
of objective reporting, thus the “Propaganda Theory”114 could also be relevant.  
 
However, one could claim that the Government used the media to promote the Expo‟s 
success to the public, and therefore promote the people‟s own success. As such, in this case 
it is important to bear in mind that this was not only a prestige project for the Government, 
but for the Chinese people as well, in particular those from Shanghai. The media in that 
case also responded to the public‟s wishes. Chinese industries, organizations and 
businesses were involved in Expo in terms of financial support and for them it would only 
be beneficial if the accounts from the event were positive. Maybe one could say that the 
reporting of the Expo covered the needs of the three key stakeholders, the Government, the 
market and the public. 
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Positive reporting of an international prestige project is not just a Chinese characteristic. It 
is common that the media of a host country (Expo, Olympics, World Cup) mostly reports 
positively on the event itself, though in some cases more critical than the Chinese press 
treated the Expo. In this particular case the foreign media also contained mostly stories on 
the overall success of the event. It would have been interesting to further investigate if the 
foreign media had critical observations of the event. However, this is beyond the purpose 
of this paper.  
 
The next section contains the analysis of the second selected media event, the 2010 Nobel 
Peace Prize.  
4.1.2. Case 2 – 2010 Nobel Peace Prize 
Contrary to the World Expo, the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize was perceived as a negative 
occurrence by the Chinese Government. The award was granted to Liu Xiaobo, who has 
been sentenced to 11 years in prison for taking part in several activities that pose a threat 
to the Chinese Government.
115
 International media reported that after the winner of the 
Nobel Peace Prize was announced, the Chinese state media was accusing the Nobel 
Committee in Norway of using the prize as a political tool. Xinhua wrote: “Jagland and 
his fellows have repeatedly used the Nobel Prize as a political tool. Last year, they 
deployed it to serve the interest of Europe, and this year they did it again to serve the 
interest of certain forces in the West who still enshrine the Cold War ideology.” The same 
article claims that the prize is another attempt to sabotage “the rise of the country”.116 In 
Norway the 2010 Nobel Peace prize received both positive and negative reactions. Most 
outspoken were probably the Norwegian business community claiming that giving the 
prize to Liu only harmed the relationship between Norway and China, a position 
supported by the political left in Norway.
117
  
The matter of Liu winning the Peace Prize has once again pushed the issue of human 
rights in China to the forefront of international debates. The Chinese Government has been 
clear on its stance on the matter. As The Economist reported a month after the decision, 
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quoting the statement of a Deputy Foreign Minister: “… other countries faced a stark 
choice: either take part in “this political game” over Mr. Liu or develop friendly relations 
with China. Make wrong choice, he threatened, and “they will have to bear the 
consequences”.118 The Chinese Government said it is firmly against attempts by any 
country or individual to use the Nobel Peace Prize to interfere in China's internal affairs 
and infringe on its judicial sovereignty.
119
   
Only one of the two chosen media contained mentions of this event, and below are 
examples from Xinhua News Agency.  
1) Awarding the Nobel Peace Prize to China's Liu Xiaobo desecrated the prize and could harm 
China-Norway ties, said Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Ma Zhaoxu on Friday. The 
Nobel Peace Prize should be awarded to people who contribute to national harmony, country-
to-country friendship, advancing disarmament, and convening and propagandizing peace 
conferences, Ma said. Ma said Liu was a criminal sentenced by the Chinese judicial 
authorities for violating Chinese law. "What he has done is contrary to the purpose of the 
Nobel Peace Prize," he said.  
120
 
2) It is a big mistake to grant this year's Nobel Peace Prize to Liu Xiaobo as the Chinese 
receiver made no contribution to peace or conflict reduction, a Norwegian professor said 
Tuesday. "I therefore cannot see that the peace prize winner fulfills the most important criteria 
in Nobel's testament. Therefore it is a mistake," added the professor of social psychology and 
China expert. The Chinese Foreign Ministry on Tuesday blasted the awarding as showing "no 
respect for China's judicial system," saying that Beijing questions the "true intention" behind 
the selection.
121
 
3) The awarding demonstrates that the once prestigious prize has degenerated into a political 
tool of some Western powers. According to Nobel's wishes, the Peace Prize should be awarded 
to person(s) who "shall have done the most or the best work for fraternity between nations, for 
the abolition or reduction of standing armies and for the holding and promotion of peace 
congresses." However, the committee awarded it in 1989 to the Dalai Lama, who strove to 
separate China and disrupt ethnic harmony. This year, the committee honored a person who 
has violated Chinese law. The decision also shows that a few Westerners are unable to come to 
terms with China's growth, and therefore try to tarnish the image of China by all means.
122
 
 4) "What is the true intention of those foreign political figures and governments who support 
the granting of the Nobel Peace Prize to Mr. Liu Xiaobo? Is it because they resent China's 
development path and hate China's political system?" Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman 
Ma Zhaoxu questioned. "China's affairs should be left to Chinese people themselves," Ma said, 
adding that the few biased individuals with the Norwegian Nobel Committee had no right to 
judge China, and western governments had no right to interfere in China's internal affairs.
123
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5) It is said that the Norwegian Nobel Committee has long believed that there is a close link 
between human rights and peace. If that is true, in what ways have Liu's actions contributed to 
human rights progress for China's 1.3 billion people? The Chinese government has always 
paid great attention to poverty alleviation, which is closely related to the rights of subsistence 
and development. From 1978 to 2008, the population living under the poverty line dropped 
from 250 million to about 40 million. The decision to award a convicted criminal only 
disgraces the Nobel Peace Prize itself and destroys its credibility in China.
124
 
6) China said Thursday its relations with Norway had been affected by the Oslo-based Nobel 
Committee's decision to grant this year's Nobel Peace Prize to convicted Chinese criminal Liu 
Xiaobo. "I think it is difficult to maintain China-Norway relations as well as they were in the 
past, because the Nobel Committee conferred the Nobel Peace Prize on a convicted Chinese 
criminal, and the Norwegian government publicly expressed its support for such a decision," 
said Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu. "The issue of Liu Xiaobo is not a 
matter of free speech and human rights. It is a matter of respecting other countries' judicial 
rights and how to view China's development path and social system," she added.
125
 
Following the announcement of the prize being awarded to Liu, the Chinese media only 
reported the Chinese Government‟s reaction and those supporting its stance. The extracts 
are of similar tone and highly political: Example 1) states on the day of the announcement 
that the Chinese Government opposes the award to dissident Liu Xiaobo, and what Liu 
has contributed with is in direct conflict with the purpose of the Nobel Peace Prize, he is 
in fact sentenced for violating Chinese law. The second example affirms how people 
outside China also see the award going to Liu as a big mistake, due to the fact the winner 
does not fulfill the criteria in Nobel‟s testament and crosses the line in mutual respect for a 
country‟s sovereignty. Example 3) reminds how the Nobel Committee also went against 
the Chinese Government in 1989, by giving the Nobel Peace Prize to the Dalai Lama, who 
Xinhua states: tried to separate China and disrupt ethnic harmony. Example 4) goes 
further and claims that those supporting the granting of the Nobel Peace Prize to Liu 
actually offend China‟s development path, and political system. Example 5) states the 
success of the political system in China, and lists several success factors, and asks what 
Liu has done to improve life for the Chinese people.  Example 6) confirms that the 
relationship between Norway and China has being negatively affected, because the 
Norwegian Government publicly supported the decision of the Nobel Committee. Norway 
crossed the line by showing disrespect for China‟s judicial and social system and 
development. 
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4.1.2.1 Responding to research questions and summing up   
From the reporting of the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize it is clear that the Chinese Government 
decided what was reported and how it was reported. It was only Xinhua and other Party-
driven official media that covered the event and they followed the same political line. In a 
way one can say that the media limited its voice to describing the success of the Party in 
improving people‟s livelihoods, seemingly illustrating the status quo. However, the articles 
examined in this thesis are considered subjective and lacking an objective voice. The 
Chinese Government has declared itself as the only official channel for reporting about the 
Nobel Peace Prize being awarded to Liu.  
 
This case illustrates the media‟s role in promoting Party policies, and how only selected 
factions of opinions are being aired through the official media channels. In Communist 
tradition, the Government and/or the Party define what is in the public‟s interest. The 
media speak in this case for the Government and ensure its interest. In terms of the market, 
its interest lies in a stable society, not in political unrest and instability. Since the case of 
the Nobel Peace Prize is such a sensitive matter, the Chinese Government decided that 
only one official line of reporting should be followed. Few media reported the case and 
those that did, followed the Government‟s regulations and line accordingly. It is likely that 
many Chinese do not even know what the Nobel Peace Prize is, who Liu Xiaobo is, or that 
the Prize was awarded to a Chinese. The public is therefore deprived of the choice of 
obtaining information on the issue. Therefore it can be seen from this case that the media is 
working for the Government and the market, excluding the public. 
4.1.3. Discrepancies between the two media events  
When looking at the coverage of the two media events, one finds quite similar reporting 
styles. However, their purpose was quite opposite. The positive Expo related news was 
meant to strengthen Chinese nationalism and enhance awareness of China‟s image and role 
on the global arena. Whereas the reporting of the Nobel Prize was done in a manner to 
leave no doubt that China is correct and the Nobel Committee is wrong. Liu being awarded 
the 2010 Peace Prize was like a punch in the face for the Chinese Government as it had the 
potential to harm China‟s image both nationally and internationally. Due to the fact that the 
Government had such strict control over the reporting of the case, a national scandal was 
prevented. One could also assume that the Chinese Government used the Nobel Prize as a 
tool to claim the “West is attacking China” and “victimizing it in a similar fashion as 
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during the Opium Wars”. It is not the first time China has reacted strongly to the Nobel 
Prize. Many Chinese, both writers and economists have been upset in the past that their 
work went unrecognized by the Nobel Committee. In the case of Gao Xingjian receiving 
the Nobel Prize for literature in 2000, it only angered the Chinese as Gao was at the time 
living in Paris and was considered a dissident author.
126
 They saw it as an insult to China, 
just as with the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to Liu was seen as an insult to Chinese 
society. This will be further elaborated on in Chapter 5.   
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4.2. Interviews  
In this section data from interviews conducted with key individuals working in various 
circles of the Chinese media industry will be presented. The purpose of this is to see how 
the professional actors see the system and their role in Chinese society. The interviews 
have been conducted between February 2011 and June 2011 in Shanghai, Beijing and 
Shenzhen. The first table illustrates how and if the journalists experience that their daily 
work is influenced by CCP policies. The table exemplifies how journalists in China work 
in a one-party-state in the modern information age.  
 
TABLE 3, To what degree does CCP bear influence on your daily work?  
Media CCP Influence 
Shanghai Daily, 
Reporter local news  
Working as a journalist in China there are certain rules that you just obey, no 
questions asked. Both the journalists and the public know this.  
Shanghai Media Group, 
International Relations   
Media and Government are one: you work for media, you take orders from the 
Government. 
21
st
 China Business 
Herald, Financial 
reporter 
It is not only controlled by the CCP, but also by the Government on local level. 
We receive orders on what we can and cannot write, that is how it is.  
International Channel 
Shanghai, Host and 
reporter 
 
All is under Government supervision. We get a license which we have to renew 
every year, every 3-5 year we have to take a test to check our knowledge and 
stances in various topics.  
Shanghai Media Group, 
Producer and business 
development manager  
SMG is directly under CCP. The news department is more influenced than the 
feature department. 
China Daily, Reporter 
(international affairs)  
CCP highly influences my daily work. There are several topics we are obliged to 
report on, such as national sessions and government topics, and there are 
restrictions what we cannot report on. Since we are directly under CCP, we 
cannot report news harming China‟s image and the Central Government, but we 
try to report on sensitive issues as best as possible.   
Phoenix TV, Director of 
documentaries (finance, 
environment) 
Even though we are listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, we have to follow 
the regulations set by CCP. Maybe we can talk a little freer, but we cannot cross 
the line.  
Xinhua News Agency, 
Financial reporter   
Xinhua has two functions, report to the public the policies of the Government and 
report to the Party about the public. We basically serve the Party and ensure 
their interests.  
CCTV, Economic and 
Financial reporter 
The official line is made by the Central Government, you do not criticize it. 
Stability come first, we don‟t need problems, that‟s the basic line. Eventually 
reporters get disciplined and follow the regulations.  
QQ/ Tencent, Senior 
Business Manager 
Daily influence. Even though we are listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, 
we have to obey the rules and regulation by the Government. If something we do 
gets too sensitive, we can risk being closed down.  
 
As one can read from the answers, they all agree that their daily work is directly influenced 
by the CCP – seen as something natural in a communist society. Almost all the interview 
subjects mention rules, regulations or instructions as part of the CCP influence. It is 
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therefore interesting to see how the instructions are being passed down from the 
Government to the employees of different media.  
 
TABLE 4, Instructions given by the Government   
Media Instructions  
Shanghai Daily, Reporter 
local news 
The Security Bureau sends out documents explaining the bottom line of how to 
report on certain issues and those are followed by all. There are always several 
editors that read the pieces before they go to print, if something is posted online 
that is considered too sensitive, the Government asks the media to remove it. 
Shanghai Media Group, 
International Relations   
Media and Government is the same thing, you can not separate them, this 
notion is not in the Chinese mind. It is from top to bottom, and it is not our 
place to questions. 
21
st
 China Business 
Herald, Financial reporter 
Each day at 2 pm the editor receives a document from the Propaganda 
Department, telling how to report on certain current issues, what can be said, 
which words can be used, along with official photographs.  
International Channel 
Shanghai, Host and 
reporter 
 
In meetings before we go on air we are told which topics are sensitive and 
which terms we cannot use. We can only critique the Party in a mild way, in 
things that are commonly known and the Party is ok with an open discussion. 
No harsh criticism is allowed.  
 Shanghai Media Group, 
Producer and business 
development manager 
We get verbal messages, sms and emails stating the regulations and updated 
policies. 
China Daily, Reporter 
(international affairs) 
When something sensitive happens, Xinhua sends out a press release to all 
media. This is the line that has to be followed. If an accident happens, editors 
receive a document with set rules, a list of what to say and not. Examples of 
sensitive issues are Liu Xiaobo, 4
th
 of June, Google and media censorship.  
Phoenix TV, Director of 
documentaries (finance, 
environment) 
The bosses let us know what direction we are going, but we always try to go a 
little further.  
Xinhua News Agency, 
Financial reporter   
Since we are directly under the CCP we receive tasks from our editors. We 
know what we should report, and what we shouldn‟t. All news we do are 
censored, but financial reporting is freer than political reporting. We can 
report almost anything, but some reports only reach the Government.  
CCTV, Economic and 
Financial reporter 
The managers receive guidelines from above and they pass it on to us in 
meetings. We know what we can and cannot say and do, we have to follow the 
official line. Scripts are always read by the manager, finally approved by the 
director of the department, the show is also watched before it is aired.  
QQ/ Tencent, Senior 
Business Manager 
N/A 
 
The instructions passed down by the Government to the interviewed journalists are 
accepted as an expected part of their work. One of the interview subjects explained that 
journalists and the general public do not have the notion of the media and the Government 
as separate entities. It is commonly accepted that there should be no criticism towards the 
Central Government. Even though this is not part of the instructions given by the 
Government this thought is strongly entrenched in the mind of the media employees. Next, 
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the journalists were asked about possible punishments if instructions are not followed or 
commonly set lines are overstepped.  
 
TABLE 5, Punishment if instructions are not followed  
Media Answers regarding punishment 
Shanghai Daily, 
Reporter local news 
N/A 
Shanghai Media Group, 
International Relations   
A mistake can influence your career. One example: A CCTV reporter mentioned 
Taiwan as a country during the Japan earthquake, and he was not to be seen on 
TV the day after… why?  
21
st
 China Business 
Herald, Financial 
reporter 
If we do not follow the regulations, we can be fined or taken into questioning by 
police. Worst case if a newspaper does not oblige to the rules, it will be closed 
down. If I come across a sensitive matter, I try to rewrite to avoid the sensitive 
words, it is up to the editor if they publish. 
International Channel 
Shanghai, Host and 
reporter 
N/A 
 Shanghai Media 
Group, Producer and 
business development 
manager 
If you say or do the wrong thing, you will have to write a letter of apology or you 
can possibly be downgraded.   
China Daily, Reporter 
(international affairs) 
There is something called “coffee time” for reporters and photographers when 
there is an accident or a sensitive event of some sort (demonstrations, fires), 
journalists and photographers are taken away for a certain amount of time by the 
police. When there is nothing left to report, they are free to go. If you cross the 
line you have to write an apology letter to the Government and could be fined.  
Phoenix TV, Director 
of documentaries 
(finance, environment) 
If you work in the media, there is always someone watching you, you have to be 
careful, or they can lock you up. I can be dismissed or jailed, and even my family 
could be jailed or get in to trouble. We know that this has happened in the past.  
Xinhua News Agency, 
Financial reporter  
We can be fined or dismissed. 
CCTV, Economic and 
Financial reporter 
It is not worth the risk crossing the line.  
QQ/ Tencent, Senior 
Business Manager 
The company can be punished. 
 
From the answers given above one can read that most of the people working in the media 
sector are aware that they are being watched. If they do a mistake in terms of overstepping 
their bounds, they can be punished, or as some claim, their family members can “get into 
trouble”. What seems to be common is the self-censorship that the media worker places 
upon him/herself. As one person said: “It is not worth crossing the line”. In the last table 
the interview subjects openly talk about their experiences and feelings towards the system 
of which they are a part, voluntarily or not.  
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TABLE 6, Thought on current media system  
Media  Opinions and thoughts   
Shanghai Daily, 
Reporter local news 
It is dangerous talking about these things in public, since we are talking in 
English it is a little safer. It is actually the same with media, the English language 
media is a little freer, but still they have to follow the same rules as Chinese 
language media. We always keep the rules and regulations in the back of our 
mind. 
Shanghai Media Group, 
International Relations   
Media and Government is the same thing, you can not separate them, this notion 
is not in the Chinese mind. It is from top to bottom, it is not our place to 
questions. Who would want to risk it? One person‟s opinion is not enough to 
change the system, and the risks of putting these opinions out there may be very 
harmful to yourself and your family. Government is number 1, and I do not think 
there will be many changes the next 10 years.   
21
st
 China Business 
Herald, Financial 
reporter 
 
China does not have a healthy environment for free press. I would like it to be 
free, but now is not the time, it is not good for China in a long time perspective. 
The Chinese people are used to the media as it is, it is not the time for change. 
Before it was only propaganda news, now there is one voice but many different 
channels. So in a way it is improving.  
International Channel 
Shanghai, Host and 
reporter 
N/A 
Shanghai Media Group, 
Producer and business 
development manager 
The control of the media is getting more relaxed, but it will not change as long as 
the CCP is in charge. For me the current situation is ok, it is the way it is, it is 
inevitable.  
China Daily, Reporter 
(international affairs) 
In China there is only one opinion, that is how it is.  The English language 
newspapers try to follow more western style journalism, to show opposite opinion 
and create a debate.  
Phoenix TV, Director of 
documentaries (finance, 
environment) 
I think the system is necessary, but not necessarily correct. I do not think it will 
change as long as CCP is in power. Sometimes I find it difficult when I know 
there is a problem affecting ordinary people, and we cannot report it.  
Xinhua News Agency, 
Financial reporter   
I think the media will become more diversified in the next 10 years. The internet 
challenges the traditional media, the media has to cater the people‟s interest.  
CCTV, Economic and 
Financial reporter 
Personally I can‟t work anymore, the job is becoming more difficult. I have lost 
my ambition. Things are being controlled tighter than before, there is a 
conservative rise in Maoism, the Party and nationalism is booming. We‟ve done 
good, but we can do better. Studying abroad, I was trained to find different 
opinions and voices for stories, but coming back to China to work, after trying a 
few times, you see that it is not much choice. But sometimes we try to be ethical 
and report the wrongdoings and sometimes we succeed, and then you make an 
impact.  
QQ/ Tencent, Senior 
Business Manager 
Media is too important for the Government. They have to be in strict control. It‟s 
not right, but there is no other way for China now. The population is too big and 
it can be dangerous. This is the special China way, it will change little by little.  
 
It is interesting to hear the honest opinions of individual members of Chinese media 
employees relating to the system and the role of the media in today‟s society. On the one 
hand, most of them see the need for the media in its current form. Some mention that the 
Chinese public is not ready for an open press, that the environment in Chinese society is 
not yet ripe for that. On the other hand some of them regard the situation they are in as 
hopeless. The reporter from CCTV has given up on his/hers journalistic ideals. One can 
find that those educated outside mainland China want a more open press, and that they 
sometime feel helpless in the situation they are in, mentioning that there are wrongdoings 
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conducted by the Government they cannot report on. Some of the interviewees find the 
media situation acceptable, not criticizing the system. Another says he/she thinks there 
have been positive changes in recent years with the increasing amount of channels which 
help to reflect the diversity. The internet is mentioned as a possible factor that will change 
and challenge the current media control, but most of the interviewees do not see a change 
in the media system until there is a change in the one-party political system in China.   
 
4.3. Summing up  
Chapter 4 presents and analyzes current empirical data. The focus of the analysis are two 
major media events (the 2010 World Expo and 2010 Nobel Peace Prize), and 
interviews/conversations with 10 Chinese media staff. Through examining the selected 
media cases one can claim that the media seems to follow the party doctrine. However, 
when investigating the gathered materials from the interviews one can find that except 
from the common agreement on CCP influence in the media and journalists‟ roles, there is 
also an acceptance of the way the media are operating in China today. An interesting point 
for discussion is how some of the journalists mention that the media and the Government 
represent one entity; there is no sense of separation of the two in the Chinese mindset. 
Even though there is a discontent towards the direct influence the CCP has, there is still a 
sense of inevitability of the system, and some of the interviewees even claimed that the 
Chinese population is not yet ready for a free press.  
 
In general, the findings from the interview section show that most of the interview subjects 
are somewhat at ease with the media situation today, they do not see it as perfect, but they 
consider it sufficient for the time-being. The media cases selected for this analysis illustrate 
that the media, in cases of positive reporting, serves its purpose of reporting to and for the 
public, for the Government and the market. But when it comes to politically sensitive 
information, the public is excluded. It seems although, that the majority of the people are 
content with the media and the political system in China. If that is a correct assumption, 
does this not border on democratic ideals? One can question whether or not the media is 
actually functioning as they should in today‟s China. What does the future hold? This will 
be discussed in the next chapter. 
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5. ANALYSIS - EMPIRICAL DATA CONFRONTED WITH 
ASSUMPTIONS  
In this chapter the findings from the previous sections will be confronted with the 
assumptions made in the Introduction, section 1.4.  Attempts are made to identify possible 
implications for the Government, the market and the public in relation to the media‟s 
changing role in China. Media has the potential power to influence the mind and thoughts 
of their readers and viewers. There have been significant changes in communication 
technologies which have led to the multiplication of channels through which information is 
conveyed, especially with the emergence of the internet. Prior to this the media operated 
under a one-way communication line. The internet has brought with it both challenges and 
opportunities for the media situation in China and the rest of the world.   
 
It has been illustrated earlier that most media theories are not applicable to China‟s 
situation today. As described, the economic transition in Chinese society has played a big 
part in changing the media‟s relation to key agencies in society. Western theories can be 
considered outdated, putting too much emphasis on political and social aspects, and 
leaving out the economic factor. The Chinese media system is defined by the political, 
social, economic and cultural environment, and one can ask if the economic reforms will 
change or relax the political agenda and media in China further?
127
 Media transition is 
often a result of changes in society. Winfield and Peng (2006) give the examples of a few 
different occasions where media transition has occurred after major changes in society; 
“social and political change, e.g. former Soviet Union; or by technology alterations, as in 
the US”.128 China differs from both: the media transition happened after and along with 
major economic changes. China is described as unique due to the fact that the political 
structures remained intact, communist policies continued, while the economy turned more 
and more toward a capitalist model. Winfield and Peng (2006) claim this is a brand new 
case in the studies of media transition and that China does not actually fit into any former 
media models.
129
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5. 1. The media used as a tool for the Government?  
During Mao and the reign of a sinicized Marxism ideology, the media was basically used a 
as a tool for class struggle. The media‟s role was to help indoctrinate people with the 
ideology and policies of the Party, and mobilize the masses.
130
 During the Deng era and 
then under Jiang Zemin, the Government tried to find a suitable place and role for the 
media. Society was changing fast with market economy policies, new rules and regulations 
emerged for the financial sector, and the media had to change accordingly. During these 
decades it seemed as though the Government was trying out different strategies regarding 
the media and searching for solutions to fit the media into the newly emerging socio-
economic context. This is something that is still occurring in China today.   
5.1.1. A glance at Korea  
State influence over the media can also be observed in non-communist countries in East 
Asia. South Korea has had a history of strong state control and censorship
131
, although 
today it is in a phase of freedom of the press. However, a law (The National Security Law) 
gives the Government the opportunity to limit the expression of pro-North Korean opinions 
or communist ideas. The South Korean Government and the powerful business community 
are criticized for imposing their view points and using their power to influence the press.
132
 
There are further similarities between the media in China and South Korea. Both have been 
influenced by the American model at some point, and they have both experienced 
dictatorship and both have historically been and still are strongly influenced by 
Confucianism.
133
 Today they may have different political systems, but both are enjoying a 
successful market economy and are strongly influenced by the cultural Confucian heritage 
where hierarchy and respect for superiors (government) is central. A query might be raised 
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when making a comparative glance at the media in South Korea and China. Even though 
they are operating in totally different political systems, are their media‟s roles similar? 
They seem to generally be following the line advocated by the establishment (big 
businesses and government bureaucracy), and are careful not to touch upon politically 
sensitive topics or issues which could harm the government‟s image. There are a few 
critical leftist liberal newspapers in Korea that are more critical towards the Government 
and the big businesses, but they still operate within the boundaries of what is accepted by 
the Government. They are, similar to the conservative newspapers, in that they are also 
dependant on financial support that comes in the form of advertisement. This is a highly 
relevant point, and it presents a fruitful avenue for future research. 
5.1.2. Confucian influence in China  
Today the CCP uses an array of ideologies, including traditional philosophies such as 
Confucianism
134
 since they are no longer able to claim legitimacy solely based on Mao‟s 
sinicized Marxism. In Confucianism people should follow their benevolent ruler(s), who, 
due to his/their “heavenly mandate and presumed moral characters”135 are best fit to rule 
and take care over his/their people and create a harmonious society.
136
 Today the CCP is 
presented as “the only political force that could lead China to power and prosperity in a 
perceived treacherous if not hostile world.”137 The Hu-Wen leadership138 uses pre-
revolution cultural traditions from Confucianism to ensure stability and popular support. At 
the CCP‟s 16th National Congress in late 2002, Hu Jintao officially became the President of 
the PRC, and put forward his guidelines which are basically centered on the traditional 
Confucian concept of he, meaning peace or harmony.
139
 The media represents an important 
tool for maintaining stability and political harmony in China. One learns from the 
interviews that even though the journalists are not comfortable with the way they and the 
public are being controlled, they to some degree agree that the Chinese public is not yet 
ripe for a free press.  
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5.2. Weakened control over media?   
One might say that in China the voice of the media is currently being shaped by the 
totalitarian political system and by market forces at the same time. The market economy in 
China is a reality, but the CCP and the Chinese Government are still considered to hold the 
absolute power.
140
 The Chinese people‟s increasing usage of mobile phones and the 
internet has changed the traditional way of communication, with over 457 million (up 19.1 
percent compared to 2009)
 141
 internet users being registered today.
142
 This number is 
likely to increase each year. Even though people are free to discuss openly, even in 
universities and class rooms, there is a common notion that what is being discussed should 
be confined to the private sphere and not discussed publicly. As soon as an opinion which 
is not compatible with the policies of CCP is taken public, either via the internet or by 
other means, the Government will most likely shut the site down or put an end to the 
discussion by other means. The media has to follow the rules that are put on them by the 
CCP, if not they can suffer severe consequences.  
 
As one can gather from the historical backdrop in Chapter 3, the Chinese media has played 
an important part in the CCP political agenda from the very beginning. Some claim that 
they have acted as a mouth piece for the Government more so than a watch dog, which is 
the role the western media tends to assume. However, even though the western media is 
freer in their reporting and most western countries have more relaxed media policies than 
China, the media is always used as a tool, either by the owners, the agenda setters, the 
government, or the advertisers. Since the commercialization of the Chinese media industry 
in the late 1970s, Huang (2001) argues that the media has indeed gone from having the 
sole purpose of serving the Party to serving ordinary Chinese news consumers.
143
  
 
Press freedom within the Communist state logic, is in principle a right according to 
paragraph 53 in the Chinese Constitution, but the Government runs seemingly strict 
censorship and control. The Propaganda Department keeps control over the media and 
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what and how topics are being reported.
144
 This will be elaborated on in section 5.4 – 
CCP‟s control of the media.  
 
The sphere with the most freedom of speech in China appears to be the blogosphere. Both 
journalists and non-journalists use blogs to direct criticism towards the Chinese 
Government without being caught by the censorship apparatus. The bloggers use methods 
like spelling Chinese characters phonetically or using different similar-sounding characters 
to avoid the censor‟s monitors.145 One example of a blogosphere news report the 
Government is/was unable to control is the train accident in East China in July 2011. The 
Government first allowed the media to openly report the accident, even questioning 
whether economic development should surpass the importance of individual lives. 
However, after a week of criticism the Government clamped down on the open policy 
reporting. There were similar situations both with the Sichuan earthquake in 2008 and the 
so-called milk scandal the same year. However, this year the Government could not control 
the blogosphere, where an open discussion continues regarding the accident and the 
shortcomings of how the Government is dealing with the tragedy.
146
  
 
5.3. China’s “rational truth-seeking elite”  
There is little reason to leave out that the CCP plays an essential part in what the media 
reports on. The seeming lack of freedom of the press in China in terms of political 
reporting makes Lippman‟s theory relevant. As mentioned earlier, he believes that the 
crowd needs to be led by a rational truth-seeking elite, who reports on news that the 
enlightened people define as important.
147
 The enlightened elite in China it seemingly 
represented by Party leaders, high-ranking officials, Party-members and successful 
business people of high influence. It does not seem like journalists provide a representative 
coverage to all significant groups in the society, which should be the ideal goal for 
journalists in general from a western, liberal political logic. The journalists in China seem 
to lack the knowledge of the Hurts theory
148
, about the right time for fact, interpretation 
and opinion. It may seem like the journalists only present the facts provided by the superior 
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organs. In a sense one can argue that journalists in China not really have to deal with the 
issue of individual decision-making whereas they are already informed about what can and 
cannot be reported on.
149
 However, even though in many cases Chinese journalists do not 
have much opportunity to choose their sources and interview subjects, they still seem to be 
able to present the information with a personal twist. 
5.4. CCP’s control of the media  
The Government in Beijing is trying to come up with rules and regulations appropriate for 
the new Chinese society. They need to balance the news flow while at the same time not 
find themselves in a position where the Government is being seriously questioned, which 
can result in discontent towards the CCP. It is believed that the current leadership (Hu-
Wen) has had a more liberal approach to the press than former President Jiang Zemin, but 
in reality under the Hu-Wen administration there has been witnessed an increase in 
restrictive media regulations. One example is the 2008 Olympics where China promised a 
more relaxed policy towards the media; “be open in every aspect to the rest of the country 
and the whole world”.150 Wen Jiabao signed a document in early 2007 stating that foreign 
journalists could report without permits and conduct interviews with whom ever they 
wanted, with the objects‟ consent. These guidelines lasted for about 20 months, until 
October 27, 2008.
151
   
 
There are two primary censoring agencies in China: 1) the General Administration of Press 
and Publication (GAPP) that grants licenses to publishers, screen-written publications, and 
can ban materials/shut down outlets; and 2) the State Administration of Radio, Film, and 
Television (SARFT) that has authority over radio, television, film, and internet broadcasts. 
They are both subordinated to the highest authority censorship organ which is the CCP‟s 
Propaganda Department, thus ensuring that all that is approved by the monitoring organs 
are in line with Party doctrine.
152
 There are several ways that the Government controls the 
media, ranging from dismissals and fines, to closing news outlets and in the worst case 
imprisonment.
153
 There are national restrictions, but both provincial and local officials can 
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also release their own directives to the local media.
154
 However, the most effective form of 
control might be self-censorship by the journalists, the editors, advertisers and private 
investors. From the interview data it is clear that the media receives direct orders from the 
Government as to what they can and cannot report, as well as how they can and cannot 
report on certain issues (in most cases politically sensitive news). The press receives 
documents explaining the line that should be taken and it has no choice but to follow these 
guidelines. The few that choose not to follow the rules can receive punishment. In theory 
people can discuss whatever they feel like, but there are still restrictions in the official 
sphere. Financial reporting is seen as more accepted by the CCP and enjoys greater 
freedom. The instructions that the media workers receive appear to be mostly accepted as a 
part of their work, even though there is an increasing amount of foreign-trained journalists 
working in China, who vent critical questions. The main line for the media is that there can 
be no criticism towards the Central Government. To some extent there is freer reporting in 
terms of criticizing provincial and local governments, but there is still a risk. And, since the 
line in this area is unclear, the journalists are cautious in their critical reporting when 
dealing with local authorities as well.   
 
5.5. Implications for the Government 
Even though political freedom (from a western perspective) is largely absent, changes in 
ownership and a more market oriented media is leading to “the overall development in 
journalism and media professionalism in China”.155 The 2010 Nobel Peace Prize awarded 
to Liu Xiabo has attracted international attention to media and censorship in China. One 
can argue that there are three significant factors to the media development in China. Roya 
(2004) states that the increasing “de-ideologization” as a result of Deng‟s pragmatic 
economic policies has made the economic imperative the only “remaining basis of the 
Communist Party‟s power and legitimacy”156. Secondly he states the “gradual functional 
shift on the part of the local party cadres and bureaucratic authorities from ideological 
supervision to entrepreneurial collaboration with private investors”157. And lastly there is 
the profit-making aspect of media that did not exist before.
158
 These factors have played a 
                                                 
154
 http://www.cfr.org/china/media-censorship-china/p11515 
155
 Huang, C., 2007, p: 424 
156
 Roya, A., M., 2004, p: 554 
157
 Ibid., p: 554 
158
 Ibid.  
 Page 48 
central role in changing media‟s role in China.  Adding to this are the challenges for the 
media to further develop and challenge the existing conventions set by the CCP. With the 
rapid economic and technological development in China, there has also become somewhat 
a more diverse coverage of events, and the growing demand from the people for 
information “is testing the regime‟s control over the media”.159 
 
5.6. Chinese media and Chinese nationalism  
A good sense of nationalism is beneficial to the Chinese Government, since it reflects the 
people‟s contentment with the authorities. On the one hand, there is latent nationalism, 
which is the internalized core of nationalism, embedded through the education system, 
state ideology, culture and social life, thus becoming a natural part of life. On the other 
hand, there is manifest nationalism - which is brought out by spectacular events. It can be 
anything ranging from a feeling that arises during crises, international conflicts, 
celebrations and sporting events. Events of this level are able to stir up nationalism and the 
mass media often play along, making it their task “to engage in a constant reproduction of 
national identity, the protection of national interest and encouragement of ritual 
consumption”. Both latent and manifest nationalism in China are closely connected to the 
media, given that the news reported in most cases is close to the Party-line. The Chinese 
media (especially those outlets which are 100 per cent controlled by the CCP) draws 
attention to success stories about China and the Chinese, both overseas and at home, thus 
building a platform for nationalism.
160
 Both cases examined in this thesis are examples of 
that. The World Expo as the biggest and best ever event of this kind, and the Nobel Peace 
Prize as an example of they (the foreigners) do not know what they are talking about, we 
(China) know better. But saying that Chinese nationalism is only a tool for the CCP is to 
oversimplify the situation. The feeling of nationalism in China is a result of the nation‟s 
history: “the ways Chinese imagine their „Century of Humiliations‟ at the hands of 
Western imperialists in the past have a powerful influence on the nature and direction of 
Chinese nationalism today”.161 The Government‟s reaction to the Nobel Peace Prize to Liu 
can be seen as an example of this. Implicit in the reaction is a feeling among the Chinese of 
western powers trying to insult China.  
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5.7. Can the current media system continue?   
An article featured in the Norwegian magazine Kapital explains how most media 
organizations around the world have gone through major changes to cut costs. However, in 
China the Government has increased their funding of the media by 37 billion Norwegian 
kroner (6.73 billion US$). The money was given to three media organizations, Xinhua, 
CCTV and People‟s Daily (all 100 per cent state-controlled). The goal is to further build up 
China‟s positive profile outside the Chinese borders, and also to establish and further 
strengthen Chinese media in the rest of the world, particularly in countries where China 
has big interests.
162
 This is a sign of an expansion of the state-controlled media, and how 
important the Government regards them.  
 
Today the media does not confront the Government and its policies to a degree where it 
would be a threat to the legitimacy of the authorities. If the media goes too far in a 
direction not sanctioned by the authorities, the Government needs only to tighten the grip 
or launch a political campaign. Even though the ownership structure has changed over the 
last decades, political freedom is still absent. However, Winfield and Peng (2006) argue 
that the media‟s financial dependency on its investors and advertisers can also be regarded 
as an undemocratic factor.
163
 Financial dependence can lead to negative influence on the 
Chinese media, since catering to interest groups (advertisers and owners) could lead to loss 
of diversity in opinion making and objectivity. Even though the media is free from 
financial control by the Government, they still need to follow the rules and regulations set 
by the Government. Former President, Jiang Zemin, stated in an interview with an 
American journalist: “Freedom of the press should be subordinate to the interest of the 
nation. How can you allow such freedom to damage the national interest?” 164 This reflects 
both the Confucian and Communist view of the Government‟s and public‟s role in society.  
 
After examining the two media cases one can see that the media has been used as a tool by 
the Government to promote the success of the nation, and implicitly, the success of the 
CCP. The reporting of the Expo showed how triumphant China was, how the event was 
hailed by the Chinese at home and overseas and by foreigners. The reporting of the Nobel 
Peace Prize showed how wrong the others were, 1) by infringing the Chinese judicial 
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system and 2) by interfering in China‟s matters and 3) not taking into account the 
successful economic development of the country. The interview section of this thesis 
illustrates that the media has to follow regulations, that the CCP is a daily part of the job. 
Working in the media is equated with working for the Government, and crossing the 
official line may cause severe problems for the individual journalist, their families and the 
media organization. It can be argued that the media continues to be a promotional tool for 
CCP policies, as the Government needs the support of the public to legitimatize their rule.   
 
Seemingly the Chinese media workers are content working within the boundaries given by 
the CCP. It is seen through the interviews that they are on the Government‟s side to 
maintain stability. The media and the Government seem to agree that the public is not yet 
ripe for a free press. With this it is proven that the CCP not only controls the media 
through rules and regulations, but that the media are operating in a sense of ideological 
hegemony. One of the reasons that the journalists (belonging to the new middle class in 
China) agree with the CCP regarding the importance of maintaining status quo could be 
that there is too much at stake. The middle class in China stand to lose the most if a 
political upheaval occurs in China. The framework provided by the Government allows the 
middle class to further strengthen their status and economic situation, hence most 
journalists see the media setting in today‟s society as satisfying.  So what could a possible 
future scenario for the media in China be, questioning the CCP while maintaining political 
stability?  
 
5.8. A future scenario   
While there are problems with western democratic ideas of the media, as was illustrated by 
the Murdoch affair, it cannot be denied that the western media is able to report on whatever 
they see fit, either for the sake of readership, advertisers or the government. Why is this 
seen as an ideal? The media‟s role from a CCP perspective is that the Government should 
decide what constitutes news. Both stances wish their people well, but regard the means 
and approaches to serve the people as principally different. In August 2010 Wen Jiabao 
visited Shenzhen, marking the 30
th
 anniversary of one of China‟s first Special Economic 
Zones. He said in a speech on the importance on continuing political reform: “China may 
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lose what it has already achieved through economic reform”165. A possible future scenario 
could hold answers to how the Chinese media can develop to cater to the emerging 
demands from the public and the market, while at the same time respecting the 
Government‟s policies.  
 
Assuming Chinese society will continue developing and modernizing, local democratic 
processes could advance and spread throughout the country. The market would keep on 
growing and the middle class would become bigger, all happening without major political 
unrest. The media would naturally develop their role to cater to the needs of the public and 
the market, and evolve into a more constructive apparatus for the public. The Government 
would still be in a situation were they can filter the news, but if the public remains happy 
and the positive development continues, the Government can prove itself successful. The 
media would develop to question the Government, but keep supporting them in the larger 
picture. One can not exclude the media from being an important part of the power plays, 
but who knows? Perhaps China can take the best from both worlds: the open criticism of 
leaders and government from western ideas, and the paternalistic touch of the Chinese 
Government filtering out the unimportant news we increasingly see in the West every day. 
Maybe then the Chinese media might be accepted as a legitimate institution in the eyes of 
the West?  
 
5.9. Summing up  
There is no doubt that the media in all societies are of great importance for the character of 
societal development. They have the power to influence large numbers of people. With the 
internet, information is increasingly available at all times. In China there are today more 
than 457 million internet users, and there is a flourishing internet community in which 
more and more people are taking an active part. The media in China is difficult to 
categorize, fitting neither in the western theories based on liberal-democratic thought nor 
in communist ones, based on the former Soviet Union. China is special, with policies 
originating from a communist political system, but increasingly shaped by market 
economy and capitalist inspired ideas. During the early years after 1949 the media was 
indeed working solely for the CCP, but with the reforms, its role changed. The Chinese 
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Government is still trying to find suitable strategies for the media that would balance the 
development of the market with the need for the Government to maintain control. China is 
influenced by Confucianism as well as Communism, and in Confucianism, stability is 
important and the hierarchical view of society is central. Concerned with keeping Chinese 
society stable, the CCP seems to believe that the people are not yet ready for a free press. 
Interestingly, this was also a central point mentioned by the interviewed media employees 
(cfr. Section 4.2 - Interviews). The Chinese media is controlled through Government 
channels, and the internet is monitored by government agencies. However, the media in 
China is expanding and diversifying, both national and internationally. Western influence 
can be observed both on TV programs and in reporting styles. Also, the financial gains are 
becoming increasingly important for advertisers and owners. Therefore, one has to agree 
that there are many agenda setters in the Chinese media sector, much like in the case of the 
western media. 
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6: CONCLUSION  
Who does the media actually serve in China and who should they serve? Who holds the 
most power over the process of news reporting - the Government, the market or the public? 
The public‟s good and interests are not necessarily the same as those of the market, and 
what benefits is in the interest of the market may not be so for the Government. The media 
in China has gone through several changes since the Communist Party took power in 1949. 
From solely serving the party and acting as the CCP mouth piece informing and 
indoctrinating the masses, it has evolved into a much more complex apparatus trying to 
keep up with the pace of socio-economic changes occurring in China (and in the rest of the 
world). The most important factor of alteration is the change in ownership structures and 
the emergence of advertising that came along with Deng Xiaoping‟s 1978 economic 
reform process. The increased number of voices as well as interests had a profound impact 
over the direct control the Government previously possessed over media. The advertisers 
were specifically interested in readership and the private owners in increasing income. The 
media was in a position where they could allow themselves to be more critical of some 
aspects of the society, such as in financial reporting.  
 
However, the aspect of political reporting has changed little, with the current Government, 
like in the past, fearing the danger of a free press. In spite of the internet and the increasing 
number of news-based websites, the Government remains in strict control over the political 
content that could pose harm to the Party. This is illustrated by the two media cases (World 
Expo and Nobel Peace Prize). It is intriguing to see how the interviews with Chinese 
individuals working in the media prove that journalists agree with the CCP to some extent. 
They actually see it as correct not to report on topics that could possibly cause political 
upheaval and unrest. Stability is seen as important by both the Government and the media, 
and this is of course also in the interest of the owners and advertisers. It seems that they 
agree on the opinion that the public is not yet ready to deal with a free press. On the other 
hand, the public remains excluded, without being given a say in what is important to them, 
what they should know and what they are better off not knowing. The media tries to 
challenge and question what they see as unjust within the frames they are operating in. In 
the West, however, the media is in most cases working separately from the government 
and is therefore in a freer position to report on critical topics. Therefore they are in a 
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position where they can “speak truth” to the government on behalf of groups in the society 
that oppose some government policies.  
 
It is important to remember that the media in China is working within the framework of a 
communist political setting where the main task of the media is actually to serve and 
support the government. However, since the Chinese system is historically unique, there is 
as yet no fixed truth as to what the media‟s role should be. Some would say the current 
system serves its purpose, and that the Chinese system has proven itself quite successful in 
improving people‟s standard of living in economic terms. According to the empirical data 
presented in this thesis, it is fair to state that most Chinese are satisfied with the existing 
system, including the media. Behind this impression it is also clear that there is 
considerable diversity in terms of how socio-economic groups relate to the media. Yet, one 
can raise the question whether suppressed groups in western society receive more support 
from media than the media in China gives to similarly unheard voices. There is a tendency 
of the Chinese media to increase their reporting on the causes of suppressed groups and 
minorities (e.g. migrant workers in Guangdong province). 
 
The media is likely to continue to develop its role to challenge the status quo, and with the 
internet the Government will continue to be challenged by the public for information. The 
media in the West (cfr. The Murdoch affair summer 2011
166
) may have been given too 
much leverage and power, so that they can operate with their own rules with less respect 
for the public and/or the government. It is understandable that the Chinese Government 
would not like to see such media practices applied on Chinese soil. Instead, there is likely 
to be a continued development of a “media model with Chinese characteristics” aiming at 
a harmonious balance between the needs of the Government, the market and the public. 
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BIE – International Exhibitions Bureau  
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N/A – Not applicable  
PRC – People‟s Republic of China  
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